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Abstract
The paper is devoted to the study of some classes of feedback control problems for linear parabolic
equations subject to hard/pointwise constraints on both Dirichlet boundary controls and state dynamic/output functions in the presence of uncertain perturbations within given regions. The underlying problem under consideration, originally motivated by automatic control of the groundwater
regime in irrigation networks, is formalized as a minimax problem of optimal control, where the
control strategy is sought as a feedback law. Problems of this type are among the most important
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in control theory and applications - while most challenging and difficult. Based on the Maximum
Principle for parabolic equations and on the time convolution structure, we reformulate the problems
under consideration as certain asymmetric games, which become the main object of our study in
this paper. We establish some simple conditions for the existence of winning and losing strategies
for the game players, which then allow us to clarify controllability issues in the feedback control
problem for such constrained parabolic systems.
Keywords: Asymmetric games; Convolutions; Parabolic systems; Pointwise control and state con-

straints; Uncertainties; Minimax design; Feedback control
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Introduction

This paper concerns feedback control design of state-constrained linear parabolic systems
functioning under uncertain disturbances/perturbations. The original motivating example
[8] came from a practical application: automatic control of the groundwater regime in irrigation networks, where the main objective was to neutralize the adverse effect of uncertain
weather and environmental conditions. We immediately note that this need not always be
possible: obviously, for the system to be acceptable, we must be capable of handling the

worst perturbations. In particular:
• We must have enough irrigation capacity to keep the water supply up to the minimally acceptable level, even if there might be a drought for the entire period under
consideration.

• Conversely, even if it might rain for the entire period, we must be able to reduce the
irrigation supply enough to avoid flooding.
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Assuming it is possible to compensate adequately for adverse fluctuations in the weather,
one might then seek to optimize the policy used. Problems of this type may be formulated
as optimal control problems, unavoidably requiring the use of closed-loop feedback to obtain
an appropriate control, since the external input (weather, etc.) is not known in advance.
Indeed, we have minimax design problems, seeking to design the feedback to minimize some
cost in the presence of possibly worst case external inputs. The particular control systems
modeled in [8, 9] were parabolic partial differential equations with Dirichlet boundary control. Among the important specific features introduced there in order to meet practical
requirements we mention the following:
• distributed uncertain perturbations -

taking values within given closed areas with

only bounds assumed to be known;
• hard control constraints -

pointwise constraints on the control functions (here act-

ing through Dirichlet boundary conditions, offering minimal regularity for the linear
dynamics);
• hard state constraints- pointwise constraints on the acceptable values of the evolving

state (with both perturbation and compensating control).
Problems with such features are among the most challenging and difficult in control theory
but, at the same time, are among the most important for applications. To the best of
our knowledge, a variety of approaches and results developed in the theories of differential
games, H 00 -control, and Riccati's feedback synthesis are not applicable to such problems;
see, e.g., [1, 4, 3, 6] and also [9, 10, 11, 12] with the discussions and references therein.
The approach developed in [9] for the case of one-dimensional heat/diffusion equations
and then partly extended in [10, 11, 12] to multidimensional settings mainly concerns the
3

system reaction to extreme perturbations, which (as suggested above) would seem to provide
the 'worst case' scenarios in the original environmental situation (8, 9]. In this way the
structure and parameters of the control functions are computed by using the Pontryagin
maximum principle (14] for ODE approximating systems of optimal control, with some
further adjustment to the parabolic dynamics and the exclusion of unstable vibrations.
Such an analysis assumes that Nature is not malicious. On the other hand, we will see
that even if the control resources are adequate to maintain all the constraints in response to
the nominal 'worst case' of extreme perturbations- corresponding to the afore-mentioned
requirements- the necessary corresponding commitment of resources might preclude an
adequate response to some other perturbations. Thus, without further analysis one may
not be able to verify a capability to respond adequately to more subtle scenarios merely
from consideration of responses to those extreme perturbations. This might leave it unclear whether the constrained problem has any global policy solution, certainly a crucial
precondition for subsequent optimization.
The present paper is intended to make a start at providing exactly the 'further analysis'
addressing this possibility, seeking techniques verify the existence of admissible feedback
policies -

meaning causal policies which ensure satisfaction of the specified constraints in

response to all admissible perturbations- as a necessary preliminary to optimization. Even
this question of the existence of admissible feedback policies turns out to be more difficult
than one might think, and we will be unable to obtain simple necessary and sufficient
conditions for existence, much less address the optimization problem in this context.
In this paper we suggest an approach to the minimax synthesis of (hard) constrained
parabolic systems based on their reduction to asymmetric games whose dynamics are given
by time convolutions; see Section 3. This approach, applying to the underlying parabolic
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dynamics, is based on certain fundamental properties of such systems, partly on the classical
Maximum Principle for parabolic equations. The reduction eventually allows us to clarify
- via establishing conditions for the existence of winning and losing strategies of the game
players -

some important characteristics of feasible and optimal feedback controls and

perturbations in the minimax problems under consideration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider the original
motivating problem of automatic control of the groundwater regime in irrigation networks
and formulate it as an asymmetric game via time convolutions. Following this interpretation,
we introduce in Section 3 a general asymmetric convolution game of two players personalized
as the fox and the hound. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the convolution game
establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of winning strategies for
the hounds. Finally, Section 5 contains various results and discussions related to the main
thrust of the paper. These include: the reduction of a general class of linear parabolic
equations to convolution systems, the justification of well-posedness of the convolution
game, and the implication of the game analysis to the original irrigation problem.

2

A Motivating Problem: Irrigation

In this section we describe in somewhat more detail the groundwater management control
problem of (8]. Here we will be directly controlling the supply in a pair of irrigation channels
to regulate the groundwater level (GWL) in the seepage region between these channels- so
called because of the seepage of water into the ground, approximately modeled as a diffusion.
We treat this as spatially one-dimensional, neglecting effects parallel to the channels, which
are taken at s =

±1.

Letting u and w, respectively, be the deviations from the desired

GWL and the averaged external input (difference between precipitation and evaporation),
5

these satisfy the linear parabolic equation

Ut- au 8 s

=

W on Q

=

QT

:= (O,Tj

(-1, 1)

X

with the Dirichlet boundary condition, which we take as our control: the scaled difference
z(t) between the channel water supply and a reference supply just sufficient to maintain

the desired GWL in the presence of the nominal (averaged) input.
approximation to take the disturbance w

It is a reasonable

= w(t, ·)to be spatially constant

on

n := (-1, 1)

and subject to an given bound lw(t)l ~ (3 on [0, T]; soy = w/(3 is a function only oft,
satisfying
ly(t)l ~ 1 for 0 ~ t ~ T.

(2.1)

We take the supply rate to be the same in each of the channels; the possible deviation
from the reference supply is necessarily bounded- for simplicity of exposition we assume
symmetry in this bound. Appropriately choosing a, we will have u(t, ±1) =a z(t) with
lz(t}l ~ 1 for 0 :::; t ~ T.

(2.2)

Supposing the GWL is initially at its nominal level, our complete model is
Ut- aUs 8

= (3y(t) on

Q

=

QT

= (0, T]

X ( -1, 1),

(2.3)

u(t,-1) =u(t,1) =az(t),

u(O,s) =0

withy(·) unknown, subject to (2.1), and with control function z(·) to be chosen subject to
(2.2); we may indicate the dependence of the solution on the inputs by writing u = uY,z(-, ·).
Our control problem is to regulate the GWL in the presence of unpredictable fluctuations
in precipitation/evaporation by choosing the supply rate -

i.e., the control function z(·)

so as to ensure that the level never becomes either too high or too low. We take the

fluctuation in water level as characterized by its value at the midpoint s = 0 and require
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that our control ensure that the GWL stays within the prescribed tolerance:

(2.4)
We may view this as a game played against Nature. Thus, while we are not viewing Nature
as a malicious opponent in the evolution of the disturbance w = (3y, we do approach this
with a 'worst case' attitude, avoiding any unsupportably optimistic assumption that this
disturbance will be of any special form conveniently favorable for the analysis of our control
policy. In this way (2.4) is to be taken as an imposed state constraint. Furthermore, as there
is no restriction on the external input y(·) other than (2.1), this is taken as a constraint on

the control policy determining the response z(·).
In this 'worst case' analysis we will view an inability to compensate for arbitrary admissible perturbations as being a definite failure for our control system.
Observe that there are typically some other constraint requirements -

assuming one

could consider them without permitting violation of the state constraint (2.4). For example,
we might wish to conserve the supplied water (minimizing the integral

J y dt) or to simplify

the regulatory effort (e.g., minimizing the variation in y). However, we will not address
such concerns in this paper.
The following statement justifies the possibility of describing the dynamics of (2.3) via

time convolutions with nonnegative functions.

Lemma 2.1. [Convolution Description of the GWL Dynamics.] Let u(·) be the
solution to the parabolic partial differential equation (2.3). Then the dynamics for
x(t) := uY,z(t, 0),

0 S t S T,

are given by convolution:
x(t)

=lot [<p(t- r)y(r) + ry(t- r)z(r)] dr
7

(2.5)

with appropriate nonnegative functions <p and rJ.

Proof. This follows from the more general results established in Theorem 5.1, where the
form (2.5) of these dynamics is justified with the expressions

(2.6)
Furthermore, the crucial fact of the positivity <p, rJ

~

0 is derived therein from the Maximum

Principle for parabolic equations .. We will also defer to the last subsection of Section 5 for

our further investigation of specific characterizations for the appropriate <p and rJ in the
particular GWL setting of (2.3).
Thus we have effectively replaced (2.3) by (2.5) in modeling the control problem. In
view of the comments above, we turn now to an analysis of this class of convolution games.

3

The Fox and the Hound: a Convolution Game

In this section we introduce the game 6, which is the focus of our subsequent analysis. We
will be considering scalar systems with convolution dynamics- much as in (2.5), except
that it is now convenient to reverse the sign of z. Thus for each t E 'I := 10, T] we have

x(t)

=lot [cp(t- r)y(r)- ry(t- r)z(r)] dr.

(3.1)

Note that the functions <p and rJ are given andy, z are to be inputs. One might well consider
vector-valued versions of this, but for our present purposes it will be sufficient to restrict
our attention, for simplicity, to systems (3.1) with <p, ry, x, y, and z scalar-valued although
possibly infinite horizoned with T = oo.
The fact that we have two input functions suggests thinking of (3.1) as the setting for
a 'game'. We personalize this game somewhat by thinking of a fox and a hound, considered
8

as moving points f (·) and. h( ·) in IR, given by the above convolutions so

f

:= cp

*y

and h := rJ * z in IR,

i.e., controlled by providing the inputs y and z, respectively. Thus x =

f- h in (3.1).

We are here taking the functions cp and ry to be the (fixed) motion characteristics of the
fox and hound, respectively. [We ignore any physical anomalies associated with this as an
image- e.g., we permit x(·) to cross 0, with the fox and hound apparently passing through
each other.] As an example, if the fox were to move by exerting a force F = F(t) and one
had velocity-proportional friction, then her position f(t) would satisfy

mf" = F- A.f'.
If we write F = y Fo, where Fo is the maximum force available -so y
power ahead" and y = -1 means "full power reverse" get f

= 1 means "full

then, starting from rest, we would

= cp * y with
cp(r) = (Fo/A.)

[1- e-(>.fm)r].

This would make our interpretation some sort of 'pursuit game' in which control lies in the
acceleration rather than the velocity. The history dependence implicit in the convolution
dynamics is here related to inertia.
Apart from more detailed interpretation as in examples such as this and Lemma 2.1, we
will be assuming throughout our discussion that

cp and rJ are specified in L}0 c(O, oo) with cp, rJ 2: 0,

(3.2)

and that we are imposing the constraints

ly(t)l :::; 1 and lz(t)l :::; 1 for all t E I= [0, T].
9

(3.3)

It will be convenient in what follows ro label r.p and rJ as impulse response functions and
to introduce their integral characteristics

F(t)
so r.p

= F' and rJ = H'.

:=lot r.p(r) dr and H(t) :=lot ry(r)dr;

(3.4)

Note that F and Hare nondecreasing by (3.2) and that the dynamics

of (3.1) can equivalently be written as x =

f- h with

=lot y(t- r)r.p(r) dr =lot y(t- r) dF(r),
h(t) =lot z(t- r)'YJ(r) dr =lot z(t- r) dH(r)~
f(t)

(3.5)

While a considerable variety of interesting games might be described in this setting by
adjusting the payoffs, our principal concern will be with the game in which the fox wins

if she can ever 'escape'- i.e., get f(t) farther thane from h(t) at some timet < T so
that lx(t)i >

e.

Conversely, the hound wins if he can 'track' successfully- i.e., keep h(t)

no farther thane from f(t) during the entire interval I, maintaining this deviation bound
throughout the interval so that
lx(t)l :S e for all tin I= {0, T];

(3.6)

there are no ties. We are then taking this game to have the payoff +oo to the fox (and
-oo to the hound) if she can force (3.6) to fail. [We could have a variable payoff to the
hound when he can maintain (3.6); such a variable payoff would provide the framework for
subsidiary optimization with (3.6) as an imposed constraint. However, in focusing attention
on whether the constraint can be maintained, we simplify by taking the winning payoff to
the hound to be always +oo if (3.6) is maintained with corresponding payoff of -oo for the
fox.] Thus, once we have introduced (3.1), (3.3), and (3.6), the game is completely specified
by giving the relevant parameters£, T

> 0 and the impulse response functions r.p, rJ E L 1(I):

we refer to this as Q5 = Q5(£, T;r.p,ry).
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Note that the game Q) is asymmetric in its definition of a 'win', and our primary concern
will be seeking a winning strategy for the hound. For this analysis we assume, in particular,

the necessity for the hound of protecting against a 'worst case' y( ·): if the hound knew that
the fox generated y stochastically with a known probability distribution, then he might be
able to take advantage of this (e.g., to maximize his probability of winning). However, in
a game-theoretic context, this would be making the unsupportably optimistic assumption
that the fox might occasionally forego an assured win.

4

Existence of Winning Strategies

Our analysis of the game primarily addresses the two fundamental questions:
• Does either player, the fox or the hound, have a winning strategy for the
game?
• How does the answer to the question above depend on the parameters
e, T, cp, and ry?

The first result provides verifiable conditions for winning the game expressed in terms
of integral characteristics F and H from (3.4).
Theorem 4.1. [Integral Conditions for Winning the Game.] The condition

F(T) :::; 1!
is sufficient for the hound to have an effortless ensured win. The condition

F(t) :::; H(t)

+ e for

every

o< t < T

is necessary, but not sufficient, for the hound to have a winning strategy.
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(4.1)

Proof. Note that the above assumption (3.3) ensures that
~

if(t)J

F(t) ~ F(T) and Jh(t)J ~ H{t) ~ H(T)

-with strict inequalities unless y
If F(T)

gives x

~

(4.2)

=±1 and z =±1, respectively.

e, then taking z =0 would be a winning strategy for the hound, since that

= f, and so (4.2) implies (3.6) -

the hound can simply sit still, knowing that it is

impossible for the fox to escape in time using any admissible y. However, in any other case
the hound must use an active strategy to be able to win.
If (4.1) were false, then taking y

strategy, since that gives f

=1 would be a winning control for the fox as a fixed

= F, and then (4.2) shows that x =

f- g;:::: F- H; so the fox

escapes- i.e., (3.6) fails- at the same t E (0, T) for which (4.1) would fail. Thus, (4.1)
is necessary for the hound to have any chance at winning against the fox's extreme control.
To see that (4.1) is insufficient to ensure a win for the hound, we need only provide a
single example. Take T = 2,

e=

3 for 0

cp(t)

=

1 and suppose that

~(t) ~

~ t ~ 1,

{ 0 else;

2 for 0

~t ~

2,

{
0 else.

These impulse response functions generate by (3.4) the integral characteristics

3t for 0
F(t) =

{
With

e=

3

for 1

~ t ~ 1,
~

t

~

H( t) = 2t for 0 ~ t

~

T.

2 = T;

1 this gives the strict inequality F(t)

< H(t) + e for all t E [0, 1), except for the

equality at t = 1; i.e., (4.1) holds, and just running away (y
escape from the hound who would take z

= 1.

12

= 1) does not enable the fox to

However, suppose that instead of simply running away straight ahead withy
fox were to double back at t

= 1. Using the input function
for t ~ 1,
1
-1 for t > 1,

y(t) = {

the fox has f(t) = F(t) = 3t for 0

f(t) =

lt

=1, the

~

~

t

1 as before, but now

3z(s) ds = 3[(1- [t- 1])- (t -1)] = 9- 3t

t-1

for 1

~ t ~

have /(1)

2 = T. Even knowing this in advance, what could the hound do? One would

= 3 and, if z ¢. 1 on [0, 1), one would have h(1) < H(1) = 2, whence jx(1)j > 1 = £

-i.e., a win for the fox. Avoiding this by keeping y

= 1 on

(0, 1), one first considers the

choice
for 0
for 1

~ t ~ 1,
~

t

Comparing, we would have X* =

~

so h*(t) =

2;

f- h*

for 0

~

t

~

1.

4 - 2t for 1

~

t

~

2.

2t

{

= 5- 4t for 1 ~ t ~ T so lx*(t)i

- a win for the fox. Any other input choice z(·) with z

> e fort > 3/2

=1 on [0, 1) would necessarily give

z 2:: z*, so h 2:: h* and the fox also escapes.
Thus the fox has a winning pure strategy in this example, even though F and H do
satisfy (4.1 ). Indeed, a modification of this example, changing the hound's impulse response
function to

~ t ~ 1,

2 for 0

ry(t)

=

{

7 for 1

~

t

~

2=T

shows, by a similar calculation, that ( 4.1) cannot even ensure the hound's success against
the fox's extreme 'running away' strategy.
The moral to be drawn from the scenario above is the importance of agility. For present
purposes, we need not provide any technical definition of this vague notion of comparative
13

'agility' while observing the competitive disadvantage of a large tail for the impulse response
function, which acts as a form of inertia. In particular, current variations of the trajectory
h(t) may be dominated by residual effects of much earlier control actions z( 7) if the resource

function ry(a) would be large even when the time difference a= t - 7 becomes large.
Complementing Theorem 3.6, we now turn to a more positive result for a hound with
his impulse response function ry: he can successfully track any fox whose impulse response
function cp lies within a distance

efrom the segment in £ 1 (0, T)

joining rJ to the origin.

Theorem 4.2. [Impulse Response Function Conditions for Winning the Game].
The L 1 -norm condition

{ll<p- CrJIIl := Jo{
O~c~l

e;:::: min

1

(4.3)

icp(7)- CrJ(7)1 d7}

is sufficient, but not necessary, for the hound to have a winning strategy.

Proof. Given (4.3), the hound can choose c E (0, 1] such that llcp- CrJIIl ::;

e and

then,

taking into account Theorem 5.2 presented below, can use the control

(4.4)

z(7) = cy(7).

With c::; 1, the given constraint

IYI ::; 1 ensures that one always has lzl

::; 1, so this control

is admissible. We then have from (3.1) that

lx(t)l ::;

<

1t
1t
1t

lcp(t- 7)y(r)- ry(t- 7)z(7)1 d7
lcp(7)- CrJ(7)1·1y(t- 7)1 d7
lcp(7)- CrJ(7)1 d7 ::; llcp- CrJII1

::; e

for each 0 ::; t ::; T - i.e., one has (3.6), and thus the control policy (4.3) is a winning
strategy for the hound.
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Conversely, it is necessary to have ll<p- C1JII1 :::::; £for the hound to use {4.4) as a winning
strategy. Indeed, if the fox knew (4.4), she could simply choose

y(t) = sgn [<p(t) - cry(t)],

t

E

[O,T],

giving x(T) = ll<p- crylh -and with ll<p- C1JII1 >£this would be a loss for the hound.
On the other hand, there are strategies other than (4.4), and we now showthat it may
be possible for the hound to have a winning strategy even with (4.3) false. To see that (4.3)
is not a necessary condition to ensure a win for the hound, we need only provide a single
example. Take

e= 1, T = 3 with

~(t) ~

1 for 0 :::::; t : : :; 2,

<p(t) =
{ 0 else;

1 for 0 :::::; t : : :; 2,

{

!

else.

Thus for any 0 :::::; c :::::; 1 we have

ll<p- cryll1

=

fo

3

i<p(r)- C1J(r)i dr

=

fo

h
3

2

i<p(r)- C1J(r)i dr +

2(1- c)+ (3- 2)~c = 2- ~c ~

i<p(r)- C1J(r)i dr

! > 1 = £;

so (4.3) is false for this example. [Observe, parenthetically, that with the same £, <p, and rJ
we would have (4.3) if we had taken T:::::; 8/3.]
We have seen that the strategy (4.4) now fails. On the other hand, suppose the hound
modifies this linear strategy and uses instead the piecewise constant control
on [0, 1],

0

(4.5)

z(r) = {
y(r) on (2, 3].
Then we easily have

lx(t)l

= I!at y(r) drl:::::; 1 = e

15

whenever 0 :::::; t :::::; 1.

For t E (1, 3] we observe that the conditions 1 :::; r ::=; t give t- r E [0, 2) and therefore

c.p(t- r) = ry(t- r). Thus for t
Jx(t)J =
=

11
11

1

E (1, 3] we have

c.p(t- r)y(r) dr +

[t [c.p(t- r)- ry(t- r)]y(r) drl

1

c.p(t- r)y(r) drl :::; 1 =e.

This shows that (4.5) is now a winning strategy: using it, constraint (3.6) always holds for
the entire interval [0, 3], and so the hound wins.
At this time it remains an open problem to find verifiable conditions on the parameters

e, T, c.p, and ry, which are both necessary and sufficient for the hound to win. Even though we
have only exhibited a single winning strategy for those cases where we have shown existence,
it is important for questions of possible subsidiary optimization that we would expect the
basic constraint (3.6) to provide uniqueness of the control policy only in very special cases.

5

Further Results and Discussions

In this section we present various results supporting and justifying the above game convolution approach and illustrating its applications to feedback control of parabolic systems.
We split our discussions into three subsections.
5.1. Autonomous Linear Systems and Convolutions. The classical variation of parameters formula is the source of our convolution formulation so this is a quite general result
for autonomous linear problems. Let us begin our considerations with the abstract linear
autonomous state equation
with u(O) = 0,

it= Au+w,

(5.1)

imposing homogeneous initial conditions and input. Assuming further that the linear operator A is the infinitesimal generator of a Co semigroup S(-) on the state space X, we have
16

the standard semigroup convolution representation

u(t)

=lot S(t- r)w(r) dr

(5.2)

for mild solutions ofthe abstract differential equation (5.1); see, e.g., [2, 13] as general
references for such semigroup formulations.
If we now have the scalar linear observation

x(t) =

b, u(t))

for some suitable linear functional 'Y and take the input w to have the form
n

v

w = LYi(t)wj
j=l

+L

(5.3)

z(t)wj

j=l

for fixed elements Wj and Wj in X, then substituting (5.3) into (5.2) and the latter into
x = ("f, u) gives

(5.4)
with the impulse response functions

ru(t) := ("/, S(t) Wj)·

(5.5)

In particular, we have from (5.4) that I.Pi = ('Y,ui• 0 ), where ui,O = S(·)Wj is the solution to

j

= 1, ... ,n.

Introducing Fj and Hi much as in (3.4) (so, e.g., Fj corresponds to taking Yi
Yk

= 0 for

all k

=f. j and with Zj = 0 for all j -giving I.Pj

= 1 with

= dFj/dt), we can write these

functions also in terms of solutions:

(5.6)
17

where Ui,O and U 0 •i are the solutions to (5.1) with w

= Wj and w = Wj, respectively.

We will also be interested in considering similar cases in which one might not have Wj or
Wj

in the state space X or in which the observation functional 1 may not be in X*. Whether

this might lead to a successful model would depend on details of regularity theory for the
particular spaces and operators involved. In particular, wewish to treat boundary control
and point observation for parabolic partial differential equations, relying on the considerable
smoothing provided by the corresponding analytic semigroups. This is given in the next
theorem, which directly relates to our original motivations and justifies the possibility to
reduce feedback control problems for linear parabolic systems to the convolution game
studied in Sections 3 and 4.

Theorem 5.1. [Convolution Representation of Linear Parabolic Systems]. Let

n be

a bounded region in JR.m with sufficiently smooth boundary 80, let A(·) be a smooth

positive definite symmetric matrix-valued function on the closure of 0, and fix s* E 0. We
consider a parabolic partial differential equation on Q = Qr = (0, T] x

n with Dirichlet

boundary conditions and homogeneous initial conditions:
n
Ut

= \1· A\lu + LYi(t) Wj,

II

ul an = "'y·(t)w·
~ J
j=l

j=l

and observe x(t)

u(O, ·)

J•

=0

(5.7)

= u(t, s*). Then, subject to some regularity considerations for Wj, Wj, the

point observation x( ·) is given by (5.4) with

where Ui,O and uo,j are the solutions, respectively, to the particular cases of (5.7):
Ui· 0 1

an

= o,

U 0 ·il an = w·J•

Ui· 0 (o,

·) = o;

U 0 •i(O, ·)

Finally, <pj and 'f'/j are nonnegative when Wj and Wj are nonnegative.
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=0.

(5.8)

Proof. Equations such as (5.7) can equivalently be interpreted by a variety of methods
depending on the geometry of nand the regularity assumed for

Wj, Wj.

It is well known (see,

e.g., [5] -especially the estimate in Theorem 16.3 of Chapter IV, regarding localization)
that if Wj is in H- 1 (Q) and moderately smooth nears* and if Wj is in L2 (an), then (5.7)
is solvable- say, for YJ and

Zj

in L 00 (0, T)- and will be smooth enough to permit point

evaluation at s*. Note that these conditions can be substantially weakened, but are adequate
for our present purposes. Indeed, we need only look at the regularity for the solutions UJ,O
and U 0•J to (5.8). The representation (5.4) and its consequences discussed above are then
immediate.
We now employ the Maximum Principle for parabolic equations to verify the nonnegativity asserted in the theorem. While one could also work with the classical Maximum

Principle for smooth classical solutions and then use density arguments, we here work with
the weak formulation of (5.7) by employing arguments requiring minimal regularity, based
on the following result by Stampacchia [16]: if

u-(t, s) := u(t, s) 1\0 =min { u(t, s), 0},
then (writing

a*

for an arbitrary first partial derivative) one has
where u- = 0,

(5.9)
where u-

e.g., one has a.e. that \lu_ · \lu =

almost everywhere assuming Wj

~

~

l\lu-1 2 .

0, we let u be a weak solution to
Ut

with Zj(·)

=/: 0

=

u(O, ·)

\1 · A\lu,

=0

0. With u- as test function, the weak version of this is:
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We now fix j and,

since we have u;::: 0 on

an sou-= 0 there.

From (5.9) we have

since A was assumed positive definite. We also have

Integrating this (while noting that u-(o) = 0) gives

which means that u;::: 0 on Q. Thus, in particular, one evaluates at s* to obtain

whenever z1 ;::: 0 on [0, t] (provided that w1 ;::: 0). [It is easy to choose Yj to have a
counterexample to this if 'T/j
that

'f/j

< 0 on any set of positive measure.] Therefore, we can conclude

2:: 0 as asserted in the theorem.

The justification that cpj ;::: 0 when· Wj 2:: 0 is essentially similar. We now let u be the
solution to the parabolic homogeneous initial boundary problem

ul an =0,

u(O, ·)

= 0;

so the weak form of this gives

with the right hand side being nonpositive as u-

:s;

0 and Yj(t)wj 2:: 0. Again we have

u- = 0 on Q and use this (for each Yj ;::: 0) to conclude that cpj ;::: 0.

5.2. The Information Structure of the Game. We should clarify the information
structure of the game from the viewpoint of the hound, noting that if <5 may be viewed
20

as 'a game with perfect information' (like chess), then only deterministic strategies are
relevant -

we need not then consider probabilistic mixed strategies. As a worst case, we

may attribute to the fox perfect causal information about both inputs y(·) and z(·)- but,
since only causally determined strategies can be admissible, we must ask what information
the hound will have available at each r in determining his response.
We begin with the assumption that the hound knows (and remembers) his own input z( ·)
-

hence can compute the resulting motion h =

'TJ

*z -

and has observed (and remembers)

the relative position x(·) = J(-)- h(·) up to that time. However, it is clear that the future
evolutions off and h beyond T include some history dependence-this was much of the point
of our discussion of 'agility' following Theorem 4.1 -

and, in constructing z(·), it would

seem desirable for the hound also to know at least the past history of the fox's input y
that has not been provided directly. The next result justifies this, in a sense justifying the
well-posedness of the game under consideration by, e.g., validating the use of such strategies

as (4.3).
Theorem 5.2. [Well-Posedness of the Game]. Let <p and 'TJ be given in L 1 {0, T] with
<p ¢. 0 near 0. Then the histories of z and of

on any subinterval [0, r] as

T :::;

T uniquely determine the past history of y on [0, r].

Proof. Take <p7 and 'T/r to be the restrictions of <p and

'TJ

to [0, r], respectively, that are

taken to vanish outside [0, r] (since anything else is irrelevant up to time r) and similarly
define y7 , and

Z7

•

Hence x 7 (·), defined by the convolutions

Xr

= 'Pr * Yr

- 'T/r
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* Zn

coincides with x = r.p

*y -

ry

*z

on .(0, r]. Taking the Fourier transforms [15] of these

functions (denoted by 'hat' as usual), the above convolutions become simply products.
Thus, rearranging slightly, we have

Note that 'r/r, Zr, Xr are known at timeT (by prescription, memory, and observation); so the
product fj:,. £;. is also known. Since <fir and Yr have compact support {0, r], each of the factors

<{i; and fr is entire analytic (by the Paley-Wiener Theorem; see, e.g., [15]) with <{i; "t 0 hence vanishing at most at isolated points - so fr is uniquely determined. Hence, inverting
the Fourier transform, Yr is also uniquely determined as asserted. Note that this argument
is independent of the horizon T, we might even take T = oo.
Thus, despite the nominal asymmetry of the suggested information structure, we may
actually assume that at each r E [0, T] both the fox and the hound have. perfect causal
information knowing both input functions y and z on [0, r] - as well, of course, as knowing

the impulse response functions r.p and ry.
We may remark, in this connection, that we are here assuming exact observation and
computation, ignoring for now any concern for continuity of the maps

Zn

Xr

H

Yr

whose

existence has been assured by Theorem 5.2. However, our discussion has justified the
admissibility of strategies such as (4.4) or (4.5).

5.3. The Irrigation Problem: Reprise. We now wish to compute more specifically the
functions r.p and ry for the special case of (2.3), which came from the original motivation.
As a particular case of our discussion in Subsection 5.1, we already know that H(·) for

(2.3) can be obtained as a U0 •1 (-, 0), where U0 •1 is the solution to
Ut0 ' 1

-

aUu0•1 = 0 on Qr '

U0•1 (t, -1) = U 0•1 (t, 1)
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= 1,

This function has singularities only at (0, ±1) -

it is analytic on QT = (0, T] x (-1, 1)

and coo across t = 0 (while taking U 0 •1 (t, ·) = 0 for t

< 0). As t

--t

oo we would have

the monotone increasing convergence of U0 •1 to the steady state solution= 1. The function
rJ =

H' is positive and unimodal, decaying exponentially to 0 as t
rylkl(o)

=0

for k

= 0, 1, ...

--t

oo; we have

and fooo ry(r) · r =a.

For later purposes we now introduce the solution V to

V(t, -1) = V(t, 1) = t,
and, differentiating this with respect tot, observe that

Vt =

V(O,·)=O
U 0•1 since it satisfies the same

equation. Thus

aV(t,1)= fotH(r)dr.
We know, similarly, that F(t)
Utl,O - a Ul,O
ss

_
-

= {3U 1•0 (t, 0), where U1•0 is the solution to

n
1 on '>It-T'

again this is analytic on QT

= (0, T] x

(-1, 1) although not coo across t

= 0.

Defining now

W := t- U1•0 , we see that

with W(t, ±1) = t- 0 = t and W(O, ·) = 0. Comparing, we then observe that W satisfies
the same system as V by showing that U1•0 = t-V. Evaluating at s = 0 and differentiating,
the latter implies that

<p(t)

= F'(t) = /3[1- H(t)ja]

Thus we get from this that <p(O) =

and 'f}(t) = -(afj3)<p'(t).

(5.10)

/3 with <p decreasing exponentially to 0, and then

<p[k] (0) = 0 for all k = 1, 2, ....
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What then are the implications for the groundwater management control problem of
Section 2, which motivated our analysis? It is clear that 15(£, T, <p, ry) -with the functions
<p

and rJ we have just computed -

corresponds precisely to the groundwater management

problem, except for a formal sign reversal for the interpretation of the control function z.
The information we have just gathered about <p, rJ and their relation shows that <p is comparatively more agile than rJ in the sense of Section 4, so we expect considerable difficulty
regarding the feasibility of this control problem without a substantial tolerance
certainly be of interest to determine numerically the minimal
would hold here, with its dependence on T and

e for

e.

It would

which condition (4.3)

a/ {3.
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